Germany's foreign policy lacks the predictability and dependability of previous years, resulting in heated debates within German foreign policy elites and bemusement within the ranks of Germany's allies.

Since the decision to abstain on the United Nations resolution 1973 on the Libya crisis, the German goverment has come under considerable criticism. Most of the criticism has been levelled at Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, former leader of the Free Democrats. Westerwelle's critics have declared that he has turned his back on the traditions of the transatlantic alliance and through failing to support France, the United Kingdom and the United States, inflicted damage on Germany's international reputation and kicked any hopes of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council into the long grass. 

Westerwelle for his part seems wedded to the principles of another Free Democrat foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Genscher, Germany's longest serving foreign minister from 1974-1992, pursued a foreign policy strategy of encouraging the reduction of nuclear weapons, restricting the deployment of the German armed forces outside of Germany and pursuing multilateral co-operation. This strategy, now known as Genscherism, has also defined Westerwelle's time in office. Westerwelle's abstention on UNSC1973 was driven by concerns to avoid entangling German soldiers in a protracted operation in Libya. But it came at the expense of multilateral co-operation, thus pitting two tenets of Genscherism against one another. The decision was also a calculated attempt to shore up domestic political support in regional elections in Germany, elections in which the FDP risked serious losses. Westerwelle's reliance on the principles of Genscherism has met with difficulties. Instead of forging a foreign policy fit for tomorrow, Westerwelle's style seems at times anachronistic in a fast changing world. It has also brought him into the difficult position of abstaining from involvement in the Libya no fly zone, whilst at the same time agreeing to send more troops to Afghanistan to placate NATO allies. The abstention on UNSC1973 also challenged the importance of transatlantic solidarity in German foreign policy.

Despite these criticisms of Westerwelle, it would be unfair to lay all the blame at his door. Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed with the decision to abstain on UNSC1973. Germany's political parties were also divided on the issue - with the exception of The Left. Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière has fluctuated between support and rejection of any post-conflict role for the Bundeswehr in Libya. We are also in a period of reform of the armed forces in Germany which has been planned on the basis of pure cost-cutting rather than strategic needs. 

With the conflict in Libya entering its final phase, Germany's lack of foreign policy clarity raises concerns. Without a clear sense of what France, the UK and Germany want, it will be difficult for the EU to play a decisive role in post-conflict management. Division in NATO on Libya also raises concerns for what future the alliance has when its leading members struggle to find common ground.

These concerns on German foriegn policy were further heightened this week by Helmut Kohl's criticism of Angela Merkel's foreign policy. (German speakers can access Kohl's statement here) Germany's foreign policy displays ambivalence which on the surface might make it seem more powerful, but in the longer term threatens to weaken German influence and the functioning of the international organisations which it is a member of. Germany's role in the Eurozone crisis has made it the leading player demanding change in weak Eurozone economies. German economic power has become very visceral. However, Germany's determination to lessen its exposure to risk has come at the expense of European cohesion and political agreement. Germany has benefitted the most from the Euro and must act accordingly. On the Libya issue, Germany appears to be more confident in saying no on issues on international importance as Dieter Dettke and Gunther Hellmann have argued. But this has not made Germany's voice louder and more persuasive. 

How Germany and its allies in the EU and NATO respond to events in Libya will play a significant role in future developments in north Africa and the Middle East. A stumbling, unsure and less predictable German foreign policy will make the West's response to events less sure footed.