Global Governance in the German Elections: Not exactly a Priority - Anja Jakobi
The upcoming German elections are of high significance of Germany and Europe as a whole. However, the outcome will probably leave fewer marks on how Germany behaves with respect to wider foreign policy and global governance. The European Union remains the most urgent issue on the international agenda of Germany, even if it is mainly reduced to questions of the Euro and the protection of German savings and money (see also the other analyses in this blog).
With regard to other global issues, like Syria, military operations abroad or interventions are rejected by many Germans, while peace and diplomacy is usually highlighted as the essence of global governance: For instance, both the Liberals and the Social Democrats explicitly mention ‘peace politics’ as aim of their foreign policy in their programs. The German reluctance towards interventions was recently witnessed when Merkel was not immediately signing the declaration on Syria at the G20 summit: A move that seemed to isolate Merkel internationally, but was unlikely to result in a loss of votes. If Merkel remains chancellor, her reluctance in taking quick decisions might overshadow even the most vivid Minister of Foreign Affairs. This is even more likely given that the Chancellors’ Office in recent years increasingly challenged the primacy of the Foreign Ministry regarding foreign policy issues.
The election outcome is most likely to determine the priorities of efforts by which issues are tackled. If the current government remains in place, it is likely that the new Foreign Minister is again of the FDP, given this party’s traditional interest in foreign policy. As a result, economic priorities are higher, while global social issues or development are less likely to be tackled intensively.
A permanent seat in the UN Security Council had been a long term goal of German foreign policy, but only the current program of the CDU/CSU still formulates the idea for a German seat – and it does so with a view to a long-term representation of the EU as a whole. With regard to security and trade, SPD and Greens aim to restrict Germany’s international weapons’ trade: the country is currently one of the largest weapons’ exporters and facing increasing domestic debates about exports to countries that violate human rights. The coalition so far pursued a rather pragmatic policy in this field, often emphasizing the economic interests in such a trade.
The current coalition would progress on negotiating a transatlantic free trade union with the United States. This is explicitly mentioned as a goal in the programmes of CDU/CSU and FDP. In contrast, the SPD focuses more on ILO and WTO reforms, and the Greens refer to their preference of multilateral trade agreements. A SPD/Green government would thus be a more reluctant partner in these negotiations, and such a coalition would place more emphasis on social and environmental impact of such treaty, including protectionist measures. A large coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD would highly value economic prosperity, but would likely agree to higher protectionism than an FDP partner.
A highly visible impact of a coalition change would likely be global environmental governance: Environmental policy is of great interest to many Germans, in particular global climate change. In that sense, the surprising turn of the Merkel government from pro-nuclear energy to alternative energies after the Fukushima nuclear accident mirrored the mood of large part of the German population. However, global environmental governance is more likely to be a side issue if the current coalition will be re-elected again. The German government liberal FDP as partner in the coalition usually puts economic questions first, which also appeals to a significant base of the conservative CDU/CSU.
Quite the contrast, global environmental questions related to climate change and other topics would likely to be more prominent in a coalition government of the SPD and the Greens: The Greens are a party that defines itself as being primed for developing environmental protection; and the current programme mentions ecological questions with regard to domestic and international policies. But also the SPD aims to start new international activities against climate change. While a SPD/Green government would thus likely push for a renewed global climate initiative, a large coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD would probably meet somewhere in the middle, environment being a concern for both of them, but often secondary to economic and social questions.
All in all, the German election is unlikely to stir major changes in most areas of global governance. The most visible differences in the German managing of global governance are likely to be high profile issues of the parties, like the environment or a transatlantic free trade zone.
Dr Anja Jakobi is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London
 SPD Wahlprogramm: ‘Das Wir entscheidet’, p. 110; http://www.spd.de/linkableblob/96686/data/; FDP Wahlprogramm: ‚Bürgerprogramm 2013: Damit Deutschland stark bleibt’, p. 85, http://www.fdp.de/files/408/B_rgerprogramm_A5_Online_2013-07-23.pdf
 CDU/CSU Wahlprogramm‚Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland’, p. 75 http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/regierungsprogramm-2013-2017-langfassung-20130911.pdf
Gruenes Wahlprogramm 2013: ‚Zeit für den grünen Wandel’ , p. 19; http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Wahlprogramm/Wahlprogramm-barrierefrei.pdf
 CDU/CSU Wahlprogramm‚Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland’, p. 16
http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/regierungsprogramm-2013-2017-langfassung-20130911.pdf; FDP Wahlprogramm: ‚Bürgerprogramm 2013: Damit Deutschland stark bleibt’, p. 23, http://www.fdp.de/files/408/B_rgerprogramm_A5_Online_2013-07-23.pdf; SPD Wahlprogramm: ‘Das Wir entscheidet’, p. 113-114; http://www.spd.de/linkableblob/96686/data/; Gruenes Wahlprogramm 2013: ‚Zeit für den grünen Wandel’ , p. 299; http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Wahlprogramm/Wahlprogramm-barrierefrei.pdf
 Gruenes Wahlprogramm 2013: ‚Zeit für den grünen Wandel’ http://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Wahlprogramm/Wahlprogramm-barrierefrei.pdf
My colleague James Sloam writes here about the likely outcomes of the German election.
The most likely outcome is still a majority for CDU-CSU + FDP. If they don't have enough seats, then the next most likely outcomes are either a grand coalition of CDU-CSU + SPD or a coalition of CDU-CSU plus the Greens. But what happens if the CDU-CSU is unable to come to an agreement with either the SPD or the Greens? In 2005, this is what happened following the elections. After some time in which the SPD and CDU did not speak to each other, a Grand Coalition was subsequently formed.
For further guidance, we need to look at Article 63 of the German Basic Law or Constitution. First, the Federal President nominates a Chancellor. If the Bundestag rejects this nomination, which it has never done, then the Bundestag moves to elect a Chancellor of its own volition within 14 days and by an absolute majority. In 1949, this condition was inserted in case the President abused his powers of appointment in the same way as President Hindenburg back in 1925-34. In practice, the President has since 1949 always nominated the clear leader of the winning coalition. In 2005, Angela Merkel was eventually nominated with the consent of the SPD and was in any case the leader of the largest party. Article 63(4) tells us that if after 14 days an absolute majority in the Bundestag fails to elect a Chancellor, it will then proceed to elect a Chancellor by simple majority. If there is no absolute majority the President may decide either to accept that Chancellor or to dissolve the Bundestag for new elections.
In other words, if an election is inconclusive and nobody can find an overall majority in the Bundestag, the President has a significant - and never used - power to choose to go for new elections or indeed to veto a dissolution and to accept a government without an overall majority.
In 2005, it was probably the threat of using this power (rather than its actual use) that led to the Grand Coalition. The President may well have told Angela Merkel and Gerhard Schröder that he would not consent to a second dissolution.
By Dr James Sloam (co-director of the Centre for European Politics, Royal Holloway)
With the German federal election a little more than a week away, it seems that – barring a seismic shift in the opinion polls – Angela Merkel and her Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) are destined for another four years in power. Whilst the name of the next Chancellor is already known, the big question is who Merkel’s coalition partner will be. And, in this respect the race is too close to call.
Will we have a continuation of the Christian Democrats’ (polling at 40%) alliance with the liberals of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) (polling at 6%)? It is likely that the two government parties will come close to a majority in the Bundestag, but the presence of the Party of the Left (die Linke) (polling at 8%) is likely to put the winning line at 47-48%. Will we see another Grand Coalition (as from 2005 to 2009) with the Christian Democrats’ main rivals, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (polling at 25%)? The two parties would have a clear majority (and this is the favoured coalition for most Germans), but many Social Democrats would be loath to join Merkel in Government given their loss of support under the last Grand Coalition. Or will we see a new Christian Democrat-Green government (Greens polling at 13%)? Although the latter has been dismissed by leaders from both parties, the Government’s u-turn on nuclear power (after Fukushima) has turned this into a real possibility.
What we can say is that 2013 will not go down as one of the more exciting campaigns in recent German political history. Merkel is not a great campaigner, and has struggled to fill halls and stadia for her rallies, but she enjoys the trust and respect of the German electorate. They strongly approve of her handling of the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, and see her as a safe pair of hands amid stormy waters. The gaffe-prone SPD candidate, Peer Steinbrück, has not presented himself as a viable alternative, and his efforts to create clear red water between himself and Merkel have not been credible (Merkel and Steinbrück worked well together as Chancellor and Finance Minister during the darkest days of the financial crisis).
A more interesting question is to what extent the federal elections might have an impact on Germany European policy. Whilst Merkel’s stewardship of the EU during the Eurozone crisis has played well at home, it is highly questionable whether her government’s strict adherence to fiscal austerity for debtor countries (i.e. Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain) has benefitted Europe. The fiscal straightjacket of the bailout agreements has stunted growth in these countries for years to come. And Germany, the leading exporter in Europe by a country mile, will also suffer – as a consequence – from reduced trade.
With regard to the European Union, the choice of coalition partner might prove telling. If we see another Grand Coalition, Merkel might have the courage (put differently, the SPD could share the blame!) and the majority to offer more generous terms to debtor countries and push forward with initiatives such as the stalled Banking Union. The less likely possibility of a Christian Democrat-Green coalition would push even further in this direction (the Greens are widely regarded at the most pro-European of Germany’s mainstream parties). On a slightly darker note, the main parties will closely watch the performance of the new Eurosceptic party, Alternative für Deutschland. Although it is unlikely to pass the 5% threshold necessary to enter the Bundestag (polling at 3.5%), a strong performance could set back German plans for deeper European integration. For David Cameron’s UK Conservative Party, this dark could have a silver lining. A good result for the German Eurosceptics could make the rolling back or renegotiation of some EU powers more appealing to a new German government.
UKIP is leaking MEPs and elected representatives faster than any other party and faster even than most parties in Italy. In Italy this is known as trasformismo or "transformism".
In the 2009 elections, UKIP did very well and gained 13 MEPs. Since then, five have left the party. Of those five, two have joined the Conservatives - Marta Andreasen and David Campbell Bannerman - while three others now sit as independents - Nikki Sinclaire, Trevor Colman and Mike Nattrass. In compensation, UKIP picked up one defector from the Conservative Party, Roger Helmer.
A party that loses 38% of its elected parliamentarians in a period of just over four years is not normal. What is going on? Is it the leadership of Nigel Farage, are dissenters driven out, are the transformist defections based on friendly disagreement, or do the transformists hold really extremist positions that Nigel Farage cannot tolerate?
Since UKIP is projected to do well in the 2014 European Parliament elections, voters might like to know that based on past performance there is a 38 percent probability that any one of UKIP's elected candidates will defect.
The British Conservatives make no secret of their desire to repeal the Human Rights Act (HRA) if elected with a functioning parliamentary majority in 2015. The HRA was passed into law in 1998 under the government of Tony Blair with the support of the Liberal Democrats. It transposed directly into British law the rather modest conditions of human rights set up by the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950. The Convention contains none of the more radical social and employment rights that the Conservatives find inimical and which are guaranteed by the EU. Unlike the EU, the parent body of the Convention is the Council of Europe, of which the British were founder members in 1949. Indeed the principles of Magna Carta concerning the right to a fair trial and no punishment without law were transposed to the Convention.
Here are the key articles of the HRA. Why do the Conservatives find it necessary to remove these rights from British citizens? Of what are they afraid?
Article 2: Right to Life
Article 3: Prohibition of Torture
Article 4: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour
Article 5: Right to Liberty and Security
Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial
Article 7: No Punishment without Law
Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Article 9: Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Article 10: Freedom of Expression
Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association
Article 12: Right to Marry
Article 13: Prohibition of Discrimination
Protocol 1, Article 1: Protection of Property
Protocol 1, Article 2: Right to Education
Protocol 1, Article 3: Right to Free Elections