By Dr James Sloam (co-director of the Centre for European Politics, Royal Holloway)
With the German federal election a little more than a week away, it seems that – barring a seismic shift in the opinion polls – Angela Merkel and her Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) are destined for another four years in power. Whilst the name of the next Chancellor is already known, the big question is who Merkel’s coalition partner will be. And, in this respect the race is too close to call.
Will we have a continuation of the Christian Democrats’ (polling at 40%) alliance with the liberals of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) (polling at 6%)? It is likely that the two government parties will come close to a majority in the Bundestag, but the presence of the Party of the Left (die Linke) (polling at 8%) is likely to put the winning line at 47-48%. Will we see another Grand Coalition (as from 2005 to 2009) with the Christian Democrats’ main rivals, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (polling at 25%)? The two parties would have a clear majority (and this is the favoured coalition for most Germans), but many Social Democrats would be loath to join Merkel in Government given their loss of support under the last Grand Coalition. Or will we see a new Christian Democrat-Green government (Greens polling at 13%)? Although the latter has been dismissed by leaders from both parties, the Government’s u-turn on nuclear power (after Fukushima) has turned this into a real possibility.
What we can say is that 2013 will not go down as one of the more exciting campaigns in recent German political history. Merkel is not a great campaigner, and has struggled to fill halls and stadia for her rallies, but she enjoys the trust and respect of the German electorate. They strongly approve of her handling of the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, and see her as a safe pair of hands amid stormy waters. The gaffe-prone SPD candidate, Peer Steinbrück, has not presented himself as a viable alternative, and his efforts to create clear red water between himself and Merkel have not been credible (Merkel and Steinbrück worked well together as Chancellor and Finance Minister during the darkest days of the financial crisis).
A more interesting question is to what extent the federal elections might have an impact on Germany European policy. Whilst Merkel’s stewardship of the EU during the Eurozone crisis has played well at home, it is highly questionable whether her government’s strict adherence to fiscal austerity for debtor countries (i.e. Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain) has benefitted Europe. The fiscal straightjacket of the bailout agreements has stunted growth in these countries for years to come. And Germany, the leading exporter in Europe by a country mile, will also suffer – as a consequence – from reduced trade.
With regard to the European Union, the choice of coalition partner might prove telling. If we see another Grand Coalition, Merkel might have the courage (put differently, the SPD could share the blame!) and the majority to offer more generous terms to debtor countries and push forward with initiatives such as the stalled Banking Union. The less likely possibility of a Christian Democrat-Green coalition would push even further in this direction (the Greens are widely regarded at the most pro-European of Germany’s mainstream parties). On a slightly darker note, the main parties will closely watch the performance of the new Eurosceptic party, Alternative für Deutschland. Although it is unlikely to pass the 5% threshold necessary to enter the Bundestag (polling at 3.5%), a strong performance could set back German plans for deeper European integration. For David Cameron’s UK Conservative Party, this dark could have a silver lining. A good result for the German Eurosceptics could make the rolling back or renegotiation of some EU powers more appealing to a new German government.
UKIP is leaking MEPs and elected representatives faster than any other party and faster even than most parties in Italy. In Italy this is known as trasformismo or "transformism".
In the 2009 elections, UKIP did very well and gained 13 MEPs. Since then, five have left the party. Of those five, two have joined the Conservatives - Marta Andreasen and David Campbell Bannerman - while three others now sit as independents - Nikki Sinclaire, Trevor Colman and Mike Nattrass. In compensation, UKIP picked up one defector from the Conservative Party, Roger Helmer.
A party that loses 38% of its elected parliamentarians in a period of just over four years is not normal. What is going on? Is it the leadership of Nigel Farage, are dissenters driven out, are the transformist defections based on friendly disagreement, or do the transformists hold really extremist positions that Nigel Farage cannot tolerate?
Since UKIP is projected to do well in the 2014 European Parliament elections, voters might like to know that based on past performance there is a 38 percent probability that any one of UKIP's elected candidates will defect.
The British Conservatives make no secret of their desire to repeal the Human Rights Act (HRA) if elected with a functioning parliamentary majority in 2015. The HRA was passed into law in 1998 under the government of Tony Blair with the support of the Liberal Democrats. It transposed directly into British law the rather modest conditions of human rights set up by the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950. The Convention contains none of the more radical social and employment rights that the Conservatives find inimical and which are guaranteed by the EU. Unlike the EU, the parent body of the Convention is the Council of Europe, of which the British were founder members in 1949. Indeed the principles of Magna Carta concerning the right to a fair trial and no punishment without law were transposed to the Convention.
Here are the key articles of the HRA. Why do the Conservatives find it necessary to remove these rights from British citizens? Of what are they afraid?
Article 2: Right to Life
Article 3: Prohibition of Torture
Article 4: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour
Article 5: Right to Liberty and Security
Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial
Article 7: No Punishment without Law
Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Article 9: Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Article 10: Freedom of Expression
Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association
Article 12: Right to Marry
Article 13: Prohibition of Discrimination
Protocol 1, Article 1: Protection of Property
Protocol 1, Article 2: Right to Education
Protocol 1, Article 3: Right to Free Elections
German Election Briefing - Defence Policy: An End to the ‘Wasted Years’? - Dr Tom Dyson
The position of defence policy in the final pages of the electoral programmes of the SPD and CDU/CSU is indicative of the perception of defence amongst German politicians as a ‘vote loser’. There is little electoral capital to be gained – and much to be lost – by a high-profile stance on defence and security issues in Germany. As a consequence, the German Defence Ministry has a reputation as a ‘schleudersitz’ (ejector seat) that has buried the political ambitions of a number of prominent politicians since the end of the Cold War.  The main priority of Defence Ministers with the ambition reaching higher office is to survive the Ministry with their political reputations intact. There is also little incentive for German MPs to profile themselves on defence and security issues. As a consequence, for post-Cold War Chancellors – particularly Chancellor Merkel, who has been preoccupied with managing the fallout of the Euro-crisis – defence has remained a low priority. From Merkel’s point of view, defence can only cause political problems hence the Defence Minister and defence policy experts within the CDU/CSU have been tasked keeping the policy area low-profile. 
Merkel’s Failure to Meet the Challenge of US Disengagement from European Security
This approach to defence and security policy is highly-misguided in the context of contemporary security challenges. During the last electoral period important changes in the international security environment have taken place which demand urgent action from Germany and other European nations. Crucially, in the context of the rise of China as an economic and military power, US defence and security policy has shifted towards a focus on the Asia-Pacific region at the expense of Europe. European states now face an urgent imperative to enhance their collective capacity to deploy military power within their geopolitical neighbourhood; otherwise a security vacuum may begin to develop around Europe. Furthermore, the context of the economic downturn and austerity measures make it particularly difficult for European states to respond to the Asia Pivot on a unilateral basis and for the British and French to continue to shoulder the lion’s share of Europe’s burden-sharing within CSDP and NATO. Hence pooling and sharing military capabilities and forces under the auspices of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is vital for Germany. 
Yet, under the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009-13) the implications of these changes in the international security environment have not been adequately recognised. The record of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition in defence is poor. A number of important reforms to the Bundeswehr have been instigated by Defence Ministers Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2009-11) and Thomas de Maziere (2011-present). These reforms have streamlined command structures and enhanced the ability of the Bundeswehr to adjust its capability procurement processes to the lessons of recent operational experiences. The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has also abolished conscription, making some significant savings by reducing the Bundeswehr from 245,000 to 180,000 troops, whilst freeing up a greater number of forces for overseas deployment.
However, Germany’s record as an alliance partner within NATO and CSDP has been significantly tarnished by the Merkel government. By opposing military action in Libya Germany ensured that CSDP could not be used as framework for action, thereby undermining its effectiveness and credibility. In response to criticism from the Obama administration following German non-participation in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector the Chancellor’s Office mandated defence experts in the CDU/CSU (Andreas Schockenhoff MP and Roderich Kiesewetter MP) to instigate proposals to reform the process of parliamentary mandate for troop deployment in order to make Germany a more reliable partner in CSDP/NATO.  However, their proposals gained little support from other political parties and were quickly dropped. Furthermore, rather than coordinating defence cuts with alliance partners and seeking opportunities to pool and share military capabilities, Germany’s military reform has proceeded on the basis of maintaining a broad, but limited, capability spectrum (‘breadth over depth’). This has led to a high-level of unnecessary duplication with alliance partners and restricts the opportunities for pooling and sharing.
The CDU/CSU Electoral Programme: Little Change
The CDU/CSU electoral programme recognises the need for a new European Security Strategy to help define Europe’s common security interests.  Yet, the programme delivers little sign that Germany will provide renewed impetus to CSDP. Joint armaments projects with European partners are recognised as important. However, this necessity is qualified by reference to the importance of Germany’s national defence industry in maintaining a strong defence-industrial base for the Bundeswehr’s policy of ‘breadth over depth’ and to the defence industry’s role in creating jobs. 
The structural power of German defence industry within the German political system (particularly the Bundestag’s Budgetary Committee that approves defence procurement projects over 25 Million Euros) has been a major stumbling block to the pursuit of common European defence projects.  Given its strong support in Bavaria, where a large proportion of Germany’s defence industry is based, the CDU/CSU will be unlikely to champion pan-European projects which may lead to a loss of market-share for German industry. 
Furthermore, the CDU/CSU electoral programme continues to commit the Bundeswehr to a policy of ‘breadth before depth’ that is not conducive to greater specialisation and pooling and sharing forces and capabilities with alliance partners. However, while the programme does not mention reforms to process of parliamentary mandate for troop deployment, these proposals will resurface in the next parliament, should the CDU/CSU win office. 
The SPD: A Commitment to German Leadership on European Defence Cooperation
Senior figures within the SPD rightly view the CDU’s time in charge of the Defence Ministry as ‘wasted years’ for German defence policy.  Accordingly, the SPD party programme is far more ambitious in the field of defence. The SPD party programme includes a clear recognition of the need for Germany to rekindle its reputation as a reliable alliance partner and notes the imperative of stronger German leadership in CSDP to endow it with greater ‘shape and substance’. 
The programme hints at a new German-led ‘impulse’ in CSDP, particularly in the field of pooling and sharing forces and capabilities.  In stark contrast to the CDU/CSU, the SPD plans to undertake a radical reform of the Bundeswehr to focus on ‘depth’ rather than ‘breadth’ that will be much more conducive to pooling and sharing with alliance partners.  While the programme goes into little detail, it notes the potential of pooling and sharing arrangement to facilitate further defence cuts.
Conclusions: Promises are Hard to Keep
The SPD have been able to capitalise on the defence policy failings of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition by championing greater German leadership in CSDP, but significant stumbling blocks stand in the way of translating the good intentions of the party programme into action. Firstly, the SPD faces a difficult international context for promoting pooling and sharing arrangements. Germany has been willing to adopt positions of national strategic autonomy on key security issues in recent years – on Libya, Mali and Syria - and this is unlikely to change under the SPD. The SPD will not be willing to enter into pooling and sharing arrangements which may place pressure on Germany to become involved in future operations which are peripheral to its security interests.
Furthermore, the willingness of the British and French to use high-intensity force within their geopolitical neighbourhood contrasts markedly with the deep scepticism of the German public and political class about the efficacy of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. This will further complicate the process of reaching agreement with the UK and France over pooling and sharing. Hence, while the SPD may focus on ‘depth over breadth’ in Bundeswehr reform, the likely path of German pooling and sharing initiatives under both the SPD and CDU are not through CSDP and institutions such as the European Defence Agency, but through bi-lateral arrangements, with the Dutch, Benelux and Nordic nations, who have a similar reticence to deploy military power.
Finally, the SPD will face similar pressure to the CDU/CSU from the German defence industry to help it maintain its market share. The SPD has strong electoral interests in seats in the North of Germany where the defence industry is a key employer.  This will provide a strong distinctive for to permit German leadership on projects within the EDA. It also raises significant doubts about the ability of the SPD to make the cuts necessary for a ‘depth over breadth’ military reform that will be an essential prerequisite for extensive polling and sharing.
 Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era (New York: Berghahn, 2007).
 Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 1st August 2012; interview, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 23 July 2013.
 Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, ‘The UK, the EU and European Security: A German Perspective’, RUSI Journal Vol. 158, No.4 (2013), pp.32-6.
 Tom Dyson, ‘Condemned Forever to Becoming and Never to Being? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism’, German Politics Vol.20, No.4 (2011), pp.545-67.
 Interview Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 23 July 2013; interview Office of Roderich Kiesewetter, MdB, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 29 May 2013.
 ‘Gemeinsam Erfolgreich fuer Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013-17’, http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/cdu_regierungsprogramm_2013-2017.pdf date accessed 03 September 2013, p.118.
 Ibid, p.122.
 Interview; Division for International Armaments, Political Department, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 29 May 2013.
 Interview Office of Roderich Kiesewetter, MdB, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 29 May 2013.
 Interview, Rainer Arnold, MdB, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 03 July 2013.
 Interview, Rainer Arnold, MdB, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 03 July 2013
 Interview, Hans-Peter Bartels, MdB, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 21 February 2013.
The German federal election, Europe, and the euro crisis
Luuk Molthof, Researcher, Centre for European Politics
Over the past few years Germany's European policy has been dominated by efforts to manage the crisis in the eurozone. In comparison to its neighbours, Germany has weathered the world financial crisis well and, in economic terms, it is doing better than ever. Since the onset of the euro crisis, Germany has - albeit reluctantly – become the lender of last resort for troubled eurozone economies. Meanwhile, no solution to the crisis appears possible without German consent. Yet Germany's approach towards managing the crisis has not been without criticism. According to Hans Kundnani (2011), Germany has abused its powerful position to impose its economic preferences on the debt-ridden countries, forcing them to adopt harsh austerity measures. Others accuse Germany of inaction and urge Germany to finally assume responsibility for getting Europe through the crisis. Radoslaw Sikorski, foreign minister of Poland, famously remarked in 2011: “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity” (“Sikorski”, 2011). Meanwhile, George Soros (2013) criticises Germany's reluctance to accept the introduction of Eurobonds, calling on Germany either to commit to Eurobonds or to leave the eurozone.
The upcoming federal election has raised expectations of a change in Germany's euro policy. However, the chance that, after the elections, Germany will adopt a significantly different approach towards managing the crisis is slim.
In debating the possible outcomes of the election, most commentators discuss three possible scenarios; first, a continuation of the current CDU/CSU-FDP coalition; second, a grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD; and third, a red-green coalition between the SPD and the Greens. It is generally agreed that if the existing coalition stays in power, Germany's approach towards managing the crisis in the eurozone is unlikely to significantly change. (Matthews, 2013). According to Dullien and Guerot (2012), the economic thinking of the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP has been heavily informed by the ordoliberal tradition. A black-yellow coalition is therefore expected to continue to 'prescribe' austerity policies for ailing eurozone economies, to continue to resist the introduction of Eurobonds, and to continue to oppose the idea of the ECB as a lender of last resort (Dullien and Guerot, 2012; Matthews, 2013). If, however, a grand coalition is formed between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, a change in policy direction is deemed more likely. Nevertheless, the chances for a significant change should not be overstated. While the SPD has publicly supported the introduction of Eurobonds, the party is opposed to ECB bond purchases. Moreover, although committed to rescue packages for ailing eurozone economies, the SPD, in line with the approach taken by the current government, insists on austerity measures in return for financial support (Dullien and Guerot, 2012; Münchau, 2012). A more significant policy change is to be expected when a red-green government is formed between the SPD and the Greens. The Greens are strongly in favour of the introduction of Eurobonds and believe that the adjustment of current account imbalances must not only come from deficit countries but must also come from surplus countries such as Germany (Dullien & Guerot, 2012, p.8). However, the formation of a red-green government is, as it stands now, the least likely scenario of the three scenarios discussed (Ed Turner, 2013). Thus, the chance that, after the election, Germany will adopt a significantly different euro policy is slim.
Because of the euro crisis, and because of Germany's central role in managing it, the German federal election attracts considerable regional and international attention. Yet, ironically, both Europe and the euro crisis play only a minor role in the election campaigns of the German parties – with the notable exception of the election campaign of the new anti euro party, Alternative für Deutschland. With the German economy running smoothly there's been little incentive for either the government parties or the opposition parties to make the unpopular euro crisis a prime topic in the election (Scally, 2013; “Greek bailout talk inserts euro crisis into German vote”, 2013)1. However, there is little doubt that, after the elections, the euro crisis will again be a prime issue soon enough.
1 Although Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble's recent remark that Greece will likely need another rescue package has stirred up the debate about Germany's role in managing the euro crisis.
Dullien, S. & Guerot, U. (2012). The long shadow of ordoliberalism: Germany's approach to the Euro crisis (ECFR Policy Brief 49). Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_long_shadow_of_ordoliberalism_germanys_approach _to_the_euro_crisis
Greek bailout talk inserts euro crisis into German vote, gives Merkel opponents ammunition (2013, August 22). The Times Colonist [online]. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.timescolonist.com/business/greek-bailout-talk-inserts-euro-crisis-into- german-vote-gives-merkel-opponents-ammunition-1.597426
Kundnani, H. (2011). Germany as Geo-economic Power. The Washington Quarterly, 34 (3), 31-45.
Matthews, A. (2013, June 24). Five more years? Merkel’s election pledge key for Europe. CNBC [online]. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.cnbc.com/id/100838567
Münchau, W. (2012, December 2). Merkel’s opponents offer too much consensus. Financial Times [online]. Retrieved August 28, 2013, from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/32d6ba56-3a22-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html
Scally, D. (2013, August 23). German election: Don't mention the euro crisis. The Irish Times [online]. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe/german-election-don-t-mention- the-euro-crisis-1.1502612
Sikorski: German inaction scarier than Germans in action (2011, November 29). The Economist. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/polands-appeal-germany
Soros, G. (2013, April 10). Investor George Soros: Germany must accept Eurobonds or leave Euro. Spiegel online. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/george-soros-says-germany-must-accept-
Turner, E. (2013). Looking forward to the German elections – a tale of three paradoxes. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from the Foreign Policy Centre website: http://fpc.org.uk/articles/606