German Election Briefing - Defence Policy: An End to the ‘Wasted Years’? - Dr Tom Dyson
The position of defence policy in the final pages of the electoral programmes of the SPD and CDU/CSU is indicative of the perception of defence amongst German politicians as a ‘vote loser’. There is little electoral capital to be gained – and much to be lost – by a high-profile stance on defence and security issues in Germany. As a consequence, the German Defence Ministry has a reputation as a ‘schleudersitz’ (ejector seat) that has buried the political ambitions of a number of prominent politicians since the end of the Cold War.  The main priority of Defence Ministers with the ambition reaching higher office is to survive the Ministry with their political reputations intact. There is also little incentive for German MPs to profile themselves on defence and security issues. As a consequence, for post-Cold War Chancellors – particularly Chancellor Merkel, who has been preoccupied with managing the fallout of the Euro-crisis – defence has remained a low priority. From Merkel’s point of view, defence can only cause political problems hence the Defence Minister and defence policy experts within the CDU/CSU have been tasked keeping the policy area low-profile. 
Merkel’s Failure to Meet the Challenge of US Disengagement from European Security
This approach to defence and security policy is highly-misguided in the context of contemporary security challenges. During the last electoral period important changes in the international security environment have taken place which demand urgent action from Germany and other European nations. Crucially, in the context of the rise of China as an economic and military power, US defence and security policy has shifted towards a focus on the Asia-Pacific region at the expense of Europe. European states now face an urgent imperative to enhance their collective capacity to deploy military power within their geopolitical neighbourhood; otherwise a security vacuum may begin to develop around Europe. Furthermore, the context of the economic downturn and austerity measures make it particularly difficult for European states to respond to the Asia Pivot on a unilateral basis and for the British and French to continue to shoulder the lion’s share of Europe’s burden-sharing within CSDP and NATO. Hence pooling and sharing military capabilities and forces under the auspices of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is vital for Germany. 
Yet, under the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition (2009-13) the implications of these changes in the international security environment have not been adequately recognised. The record of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition in defence is poor. A number of important reforms to the Bundeswehr have been instigated by Defence Ministers Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2009-11) and Thomas de Maziere (2011-present). These reforms have streamlined command structures and enhanced the ability of the Bundeswehr to adjust its capability procurement processes to the lessons of recent operational experiences. The CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has also abolished conscription, making some significant savings by reducing the Bundeswehr from 245,000 to 180,000 troops, whilst freeing up a greater number of forces for overseas deployment.
However, Germany’s record as an alliance partner within NATO and CSDP has been significantly tarnished by the Merkel government. By opposing military action in Libya Germany ensured that CSDP could not be used as framework for action, thereby undermining its effectiveness and credibility. In response to criticism from the Obama administration following German non-participation in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector the Chancellor’s Office mandated defence experts in the CDU/CSU (Andreas Schockenhoff MP and Roderich Kiesewetter MP) to instigate proposals to reform the process of parliamentary mandate for troop deployment in order to make Germany a more reliable partner in CSDP/NATO.  However, their proposals gained little support from other political parties and were quickly dropped. Furthermore, rather than coordinating defence cuts with alliance partners and seeking opportunities to pool and share military capabilities, Germany’s military reform has proceeded on the basis of maintaining a broad, but limited, capability spectrum (‘breadth over depth’). This has led to a high-level of unnecessary duplication with alliance partners and restricts the opportunities for pooling and sharing.
The CDU/CSU Electoral Programme: Little Change
The CDU/CSU electoral programme recognises the need for a new European Security Strategy to help define Europe’s common security interests.  Yet, the programme delivers little sign that Germany will provide renewed impetus to CSDP. Joint armaments projects with European partners are recognised as important. However, this necessity is qualified by reference to the importance of Germany’s national defence industry in maintaining a strong defence-industrial base for the Bundeswehr’s policy of ‘breadth over depth’ and to the defence industry’s role in creating jobs. 
The structural power of German defence industry within the German political system (particularly the Bundestag’s Budgetary Committee that approves defence procurement projects over 25 Million Euros) has been a major stumbling block to the pursuit of common European defence projects.  Given its strong support in Bavaria, where a large proportion of Germany’s defence industry is based, the CDU/CSU will be unlikely to champion pan-European projects which may lead to a loss of market-share for German industry. 
Furthermore, the CDU/CSU electoral programme continues to commit the Bundeswehr to a policy of ‘breadth before depth’ that is not conducive to greater specialisation and pooling and sharing forces and capabilities with alliance partners. However, while the programme does not mention reforms to process of parliamentary mandate for troop deployment, these proposals will resurface in the next parliament, should the CDU/CSU win office. 
The SPD: A Commitment to German Leadership on European Defence Cooperation
Senior figures within the SPD rightly view the CDU’s time in charge of the Defence Ministry as ‘wasted years’ for German defence policy.  Accordingly, the SPD party programme is far more ambitious in the field of defence. The SPD party programme includes a clear recognition of the need for Germany to rekindle its reputation as a reliable alliance partner and notes the imperative of stronger German leadership in CSDP to endow it with greater ‘shape and substance’. 
The programme hints at a new German-led ‘impulse’ in CSDP, particularly in the field of pooling and sharing forces and capabilities.  In stark contrast to the CDU/CSU, the SPD plans to undertake a radical reform of the Bundeswehr to focus on ‘depth’ rather than ‘breadth’ that will be much more conducive to pooling and sharing with alliance partners.  While the programme goes into little detail, it notes the potential of pooling and sharing arrangement to facilitate further defence cuts.
Conclusions: Promises are Hard to Keep
The SPD have been able to capitalise on the defence policy failings of the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition by championing greater German leadership in CSDP, but significant stumbling blocks stand in the way of translating the good intentions of the party programme into action. Firstly, the SPD faces a difficult international context for promoting pooling and sharing arrangements. Germany has been willing to adopt positions of national strategic autonomy on key security issues in recent years – on Libya, Mali and Syria - and this is unlikely to change under the SPD. The SPD will not be willing to enter into pooling and sharing arrangements which may place pressure on Germany to become involved in future operations which are peripheral to its security interests.
Furthermore, the willingness of the British and French to use high-intensity force within their geopolitical neighbourhood contrasts markedly with the deep scepticism of the German public and political class about the efficacy of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. This will further complicate the process of reaching agreement with the UK and France over pooling and sharing. Hence, while the SPD may focus on ‘depth over breadth’ in Bundeswehr reform, the likely path of German pooling and sharing initiatives under both the SPD and CDU are not through CSDP and institutions such as the European Defence Agency, but through bi-lateral arrangements, with the Dutch, Benelux and Nordic nations, who have a similar reticence to deploy military power.
Finally, the SPD will face similar pressure to the CDU/CSU from the German defence industry to help it maintain its market share. The SPD has strong electoral interests in seats in the North of Germany where the defence industry is a key employer.  This will provide a strong distinctive for to permit German leadership on projects within the EDA. It also raises significant doubts about the ability of the SPD to make the cuts necessary for a ‘depth over breadth’ military reform that will be an essential prerequisite for extensive polling and sharing.
 Tom Dyson, The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the post-Cold War Era (New York: Berghahn, 2007).
 Interview, Chancellor’s Office, Berlin, 1st August 2012; interview, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 23 July 2013.
 Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley, ‘The UK, the EU and European Security: A German Perspective’, RUSI Journal Vol. 158, No.4 (2013), pp.32-6.
 Tom Dyson, ‘Condemned Forever to Becoming and Never to Being? The Weise Commission and German Military Isomorphism’, German Politics Vol.20, No.4 (2011), pp.545-67.
 Interview Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 23 July 2013; interview Office of Roderich Kiesewetter, MdB, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 29 May 2013.
 ‘Gemeinsam Erfolgreich fuer Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013-17’, http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/cdu_regierungsprogramm_2013-2017.pdf date accessed 03 September 2013, p.118.
 Ibid, p.122.
 Interview; Division for International Armaments, Political Department, German Defence Ministry, Berlin, 29 May 2013.
 Interview Office of Roderich Kiesewetter, MdB, CDU/CSU, Berlin, 29 May 2013.
 Interview, Rainer Arnold, MdB, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 03 July 2013.
 Interview, Rainer Arnold, MdB, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 03 July 2013
 Interview, Hans-Peter Bartels, MdB, SPD Bundestagsfraktion, Berlin, 21 February 2013.
The German federal election, Europe, and the euro crisis
Luuk Molthof, Researcher, Centre for European Politics
Over the past few years Germany's European policy has been dominated by efforts to manage the crisis in the eurozone. In comparison to its neighbours, Germany has weathered the world financial crisis well and, in economic terms, it is doing better than ever. Since the onset of the euro crisis, Germany has - albeit reluctantly – become the lender of last resort for troubled eurozone economies. Meanwhile, no solution to the crisis appears possible without German consent. Yet Germany's approach towards managing the crisis has not been without criticism. According to Hans Kundnani (2011), Germany has abused its powerful position to impose its economic preferences on the debt-ridden countries, forcing them to adopt harsh austerity measures. Others accuse Germany of inaction and urge Germany to finally assume responsibility for getting Europe through the crisis. Radoslaw Sikorski, foreign minister of Poland, famously remarked in 2011: “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity” (“Sikorski”, 2011). Meanwhile, George Soros (2013) criticises Germany's reluctance to accept the introduction of Eurobonds, calling on Germany either to commit to Eurobonds or to leave the eurozone.
The upcoming federal election has raised expectations of a change in Germany's euro policy. However, the chance that, after the elections, Germany will adopt a significantly different approach towards managing the crisis is slim.
In debating the possible outcomes of the election, most commentators discuss three possible scenarios; first, a continuation of the current CDU/CSU-FDP coalition; second, a grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD; and third, a red-green coalition between the SPD and the Greens. It is generally agreed that if the existing coalition stays in power, Germany's approach towards managing the crisis in the eurozone is unlikely to significantly change. (Matthews, 2013). According to Dullien and Guerot (2012), the economic thinking of the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP has been heavily informed by the ordoliberal tradition. A black-yellow coalition is therefore expected to continue to 'prescribe' austerity policies for ailing eurozone economies, to continue to resist the introduction of Eurobonds, and to continue to oppose the idea of the ECB as a lender of last resort (Dullien and Guerot, 2012; Matthews, 2013). If, however, a grand coalition is formed between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, a change in policy direction is deemed more likely. Nevertheless, the chances for a significant change should not be overstated. While the SPD has publicly supported the introduction of Eurobonds, the party is opposed to ECB bond purchases. Moreover, although committed to rescue packages for ailing eurozone economies, the SPD, in line with the approach taken by the current government, insists on austerity measures in return for financial support (Dullien and Guerot, 2012; Münchau, 2012). A more significant policy change is to be expected when a red-green government is formed between the SPD and the Greens. The Greens are strongly in favour of the introduction of Eurobonds and believe that the adjustment of current account imbalances must not only come from deficit countries but must also come from surplus countries such as Germany (Dullien & Guerot, 2012, p.8). However, the formation of a red-green government is, as it stands now, the least likely scenario of the three scenarios discussed (Ed Turner, 2013). Thus, the chance that, after the election, Germany will adopt a significantly different euro policy is slim.
Because of the euro crisis, and because of Germany's central role in managing it, the German federal election attracts considerable regional and international attention. Yet, ironically, both Europe and the euro crisis play only a minor role in the election campaigns of the German parties – with the notable exception of the election campaign of the new anti euro party, Alternative für Deutschland. With the German economy running smoothly there's been little incentive for either the government parties or the opposition parties to make the unpopular euro crisis a prime topic in the election (Scally, 2013; “Greek bailout talk inserts euro crisis into German vote”, 2013)1. However, there is little doubt that, after the elections, the euro crisis will again be a prime issue soon enough.
1 Although Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble's recent remark that Greece will likely need another rescue package has stirred up the debate about Germany's role in managing the euro crisis.
Dullien, S. & Guerot, U. (2012). The long shadow of ordoliberalism: Germany's approach to the Euro crisis (ECFR Policy Brief 49). Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_long_shadow_of_ordoliberalism_germanys_approach _to_the_euro_crisis
Greek bailout talk inserts euro crisis into German vote, gives Merkel opponents ammunition (2013, August 22). The Times Colonist [online]. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.timescolonist.com/business/greek-bailout-talk-inserts-euro-crisis-into- german-vote-gives-merkel-opponents-ammunition-1.597426
Kundnani, H. (2011). Germany as Geo-economic Power. The Washington Quarterly, 34 (3), 31-45.
Matthews, A. (2013, June 24). Five more years? Merkel’s election pledge key for Europe. CNBC [online]. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.cnbc.com/id/100838567
Münchau, W. (2012, December 2). Merkel’s opponents offer too much consensus. Financial Times [online]. Retrieved August 28, 2013, from: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/32d6ba56-3a22-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html
Scally, D. (2013, August 23). German election: Don't mention the euro crisis. The Irish Times [online]. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/europe/german-election-don-t-mention- the-euro-crisis-1.1502612
Sikorski: German inaction scarier than Germans in action (2011, November 29). The Economist. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/polands-appeal-germany
Soros, G. (2013, April 10). Investor George Soros: Germany must accept Eurobonds or leave Euro. Spiegel online. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/george-soros-says-germany-must-accept-
Turner, E. (2013). Looking forward to the German elections – a tale of three paradoxes. Retrieved August 24, 2013, from the Foreign Policy Centre website: http://fpc.org.uk/articles/606
Dr Giacomo Bendetto appeared on BBC Radio 4's You and Yours today. The programme is available here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01sdg30
The latest budget figures are for 2011 (Jan - Dec 2011). The 2012 figures have not yet been calculated.
In 2011, the UK contributed 11,273 million euro to the entire EU budget. Britain got back spending of 6,570 million euro, so that the British net contribution was 4,703 million euro. Looking at the whole budget, the UK received 6,570 out of 117,337 million (or 5.6% of total spending)
CAP spending in the UK in 2011 was 3,315 million euro. In the whole of the EU, CAP spending was 42,493 million euro, so the UK took 7.8% of the share of CAP spending. The UK therefore does a bit better than average for the CAP, gaining 7.8% of CAP spending compared to 5.6% of overall spending.
How much does the UK put in and how much does it get back? In 2011, the CAP was 42,493 million out of 117,337 million and represented 36.2% of EU spending. 36.2% of the UK gross contribution is 4,082 million euro. CAP spending in the UK (as mentioned above) was 3,315 million euro. So what we have is this:
EU budget 2011
UK contribution to CAP: 4.082 billion euro
UK receives from CAP: 3.315 billion euro
UK net contribution to CAP: 767 million euro
Divide the above figures by about 60 million and you have the average amount per person in the UK!
Of course, the new budget (which will be approved or rejected by the European Parliament tomorrow) changes these figures a bit. Exactly how much CAP will cost in the future and its costs or benefits for Britain are difficult to foresee. First, the new budget is cut by 5% overall, which means that the UK contribution goes down by 5% but so do receipts. Overall, CAP spending will go down by 20% and will be spread more evenly in favour of new member states from Eastern Europe. Although the UK contribution will be reduced by 5%, the UK benefit from the CAP will fall by well over 20% so in net terms of agriculture the UK will be worse off.
Click here for a paper by Giacomo Benedetto on the collapse of the youth vote for Berluscnoni and the Left in Italy. The Italian centre-left came away from the elections of February 2013 with just 3% of the votes among 18-24 year olds. 46% of the same group gave their votes to Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement.