1965:                     5.2%

1974:                     0.8%

1981:                     unable to secure enough nominations

1988:                     14.4%

1995:                     15.0%

2002:                     19.2% (with 17.8% in the second round for Le Pen versus 82.2% for Jacques Chirac)

2007:                     10.4%

2012:                     17.9%

At least 10% of French voters will always vote for the National Front. They are loyal voters not protesters. The term ‘protest’ is sloppy for it implies that normally loyal mainstream voters protest on a temporary basis by voting for Le Pen. French presidential elections are highly personalised and take place across two ballots. The first ballot is a contest to establish the frontrunners. The second ballot is when the frontrunners fight it out to be elected. It is often said that French voters vote with their heart at the first ballot and with their brain at the second. Le Pen is the choice of the heart (a sincere not a protest vote) for at least 10% of French voters at the first ballot. Because the first ballot “doesn’t matter”, voters are free to vote sincerely rather than tactically.

The table below illustrates share of the vote in both rounds in the presidential elections of 2002, 2007 and 2012. For the purpose of this table, I do not define the Communists as extreme-left since they are part of the French political establishment since 1945 and have played a role in coalition governments, most recently from 1997 to 2002. The Maoist and Trotskyite extreme-left outside the Communist Party enjoyed a huge share of the vote above 10% in 2002. This has since declined. On the right, there is also a tradition of small groups supporting Eurosceptic, nationalist (souverainiste) or pro-hunting parties, which also performed quite well in 2002.

First of all the case: it is alleged that David Mills accepted a bribe of 600,000 US dollars from Berlusconi for perjuring himself on a separate case regarding offshore companies that allegedly avoided tax. Mills and Berlusconi were originally on trial together for this. However, following his return to power in 2008, Berlusconi’s majority in parliament passed a law to exempt the Prime Minister from criminal trials. This was immensely controversial because he had already passed such a law in 2003, which the Constitutional Court had quashed on the grounds of conflict with the Italian Constitution:

http://cep.rhul.ac.uk/cep-blog/2009/10/8/rule-of-law-upheld-in-italy.html

The result of reintroducing the law in 2008, in breach of the ruling of the Constitutional Court, was to remove Berlusconi from the trial, which then ran its course for David Mills only. It was alleged that Mills had received his bribe in February 2000. This date is important because, due to judicial reforms passed by Berlusconi, the crime of judicial corruption could no longer be punished after ten years. It would time out. The trial of Mills concluded just before the cut-off date of February 2010. At the final moment, Mills avoided conviction by admitting that agreement had been made on his perjury in November 1999, although the money had not been paid until February 2000. By admitting to the crime but proving that it had started to be committed some months earlier, the case was dismissed due to having passed the 10-year mark. If Mills had been corrupted, somebody must have been the corrupter.

Berlusconi’s trial as the alleged corrupter was able to restart separately once the Constitutional Court again annulled his immunity law for infringing the Constitution. On Saturday, the trial judge in Milan ruled the case against him as corrupter has expired. The issue rests on whether the two years during which he had unconstitutional immunity from prosecution (and in which the trial of Mills continued) can count towards the ten years after which a Court can no longer hold someone liable for the crime of judicial corruption.

If readers are still awake at the end of this explanation, they should congratulate themselves. One reason why Berlusconi is able to survive very serious criminal charges of this kind is that the details are always complicated. The easiest response is to fall asleep and accept the untruth that he and David Mills have been found not guilty.

Following the next elections in 2013, the Italian Parliament will elect Italy’s next President of the Republic. Is Berlusconi fit to be the Head of State of Europe’s fourth largest economy? Perhaps I should also mention that he is still on trial for under-age prostitution and for abuse of office. In Italy prostitution is legal so long as the prostitute is over 18. Charge of abuse of office relates to when the alleged under-age prostitute (a Moroccan citizen who had run away from home at the age of 15) was arrested for theft in Milan. As Prime Minister, Berlusconi is alleged to have secured her release by telephoning the police commander and ordering him to release her, spinning a story that she was Hosni Mubarak’s granddaughter and that her detention would cause a diplomatic incident.

 You could not make it up.

This working paper presents a new research agenda for a major problem in both the praxis and study of international relations: how states seek to influence the international system. We argue that this can best be understood through a focus on strategic narratives. Strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of international politics, and to shape the perceptions, beliefs, and behaviour of domestic and international actors. Specifically, by tracing the formation, project and reception of strategic narratives, we can explain how states seek to shape the international order, pursue policy outcomes, and enhance policy and political legitimacy. Conceptually, narratives offer a particular structure through which shared sense is achieved, representing a past, present and future, an obstacle and a desired end-point. States use narratives strategically, though they face various constraints in their capacities to do so. International relations scholars have struggled to trace these processes; conceptual innovation around ideas, norms and socialisation has not been matched by methodological precision or imagination. The study of communication offers several research traditions upon which these processes can be more adequately addressed. These traditions help us map the gates, channels and platforms through which states attempt to project their narratives in international relations, offer rich understandings of multi-national audience behaviour, and help us trace the oscillating temporalities and patterns of communication with which IR practitioners must grapple. Here we first set out how a research agenda on strategic narratives informs international relations theory and foreign policy in important conceptual areas.  Second, we discuss how a new media ecology further necessitates a shift to a strategic narrative focus.  Finally, we briefly examine instances of research designs employed by US and UK public diplomacy teams to bring such insights to bear. The framework advanced in this working paper will underpin a volume to be published in 2012 examining the role and impact of strategic narratives in critical processes in international relations, including Great Power identity, international organisations and integration, and social networks and international community.

Forging the World Working Paper

Wulff’s attempt to prevent Bild from publishing the story resulted in the President leaving a message on the answer machine of Bild’s editor, apparently threatening consequences if the story was published. The scandal raises questions about Wulff’s financial dealings and, more seriously, appears to suggest that the federal president sought to restrict the freedom of the press to report the story. (The BBC has a brief outline of the events http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16428941; see also Der Spiegel Online http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,807551,00.html ).

The Federal President is a largely ceremonial figurehead in Germany. Whilst not generally meddling in day-to-day politics, the president can, nonetheless, often reflect the tone of German society. Yet recent presidents Köhler and Wulff have run in to significant trouble, reflecting badly on the institution they represent. With opinion polls in Germany running at almost 50% demanding Wulff resigns, an almighty party political debate has erupted concerning what should be done, and whether Wulff’s position remains tenable. Wulff has sought to ride out the storm but the German press remains unconvinced by both his side of the story and his ability to recover from recent events.

Angela Merkel did little to try and support Horst Köhler when he decided to resign in May 2010. Köhler’s resignation was a strange one for observers outside of Germany. During a trip to Afghanistan in 2010 Köhler stated that German troops were there to defend the national economic interest. In a country which remains sensitive about overseas military involvement this was viewed in some quarters as being unacceptable. In perhaps an overreaction to the criticism Köhler resigned causing an acting president to be appointed, Jens Böhrnsen (the reason for his appointment was that according to article 57 German constitution, the President of the Bundesrat is automatically installed whilst the search for a new president is underway). Köhler then came under criticism for bring his office into disrepute by resigning so easily.

In the case of Christian Wulff, the criticism of his financial dealings and his perceived failure to explain his actions has resulted in more sustained criticism than Köhler faced. As a member of Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrat Party, there is obviously political opportunity here for Germany’s opposition parties. Wulff remains committed to staying in his post. But without a greater effort to explain what happened, question marks will remain over the presidency for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps the Conservatives want to have a weaker relationship with the EU than that which Norway and Switzerland enjoy. At this point, the model for Britain is Belarus, an impotent European country sandwiched between its powerful neighbours and which benefits from all the advantages that national sovereignty provides: low regulation, vast poverty, authoritarian control of a pliant workforce, and the death penalty.

The agreement concluded almost the same figure as that expressed by the Council, just 2%. Parliament and the Commission had claimed that above inflation increses were required, even in an age of austerity, because EU-level intervention is more efficient in securing economic resurgence than 27 more expensive national policies, such that EU spending represents a saving. Their other argument was that the increases were necessary to cover contractual obligations to meet spending targets agreed back in 2006 for a seven year term that expires in 2013. There is some truth in the second argument, because the way that EU funding programmes work, including co-financing, means that money is released for spending towards the end of multiannual programmes. We would therefore expect more to be spent in 2012-13 than in 2007-08.

At 3am, Parliament's negotiators accepted the Council's figures over the alternative of having no budgety. Under the budget procedure in place due to the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament and Council can each exercise a mutual veto. Previously, if Council and Parliament disagreed, each side could force through amendments on different types of spending against the wishes of the other.

Alain Lamassoure, Chairman of the Parliament's Budget Committee, explained that before the economic crisis, governments tried to refuse budget increases because they didn't want them. Now, they refuse increases not because they don't want them, but because they do not have the money. This is a matter of opinion. What happened last year? In November 2010, the conciliation process for the budget of 2011 broke down without agreement. The Commission rapidly tabled a new budget and the Parliament agreed it in line with the Council's demands. Whether the outcomes of the bugets of 2011 and 2012 as well as future budgets are due to the reason suggested by Lamassoure or, rather, to the power of the mutual veto provided by the Lisbon Treaty is a matter for debate. It seems that the lower figure as demanded by either the Council or the Parliament will be adopted.

The Conclusions of the Conciliation Committee for the 2012 budget can be found here:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/126157.pdf

This election campaign was more interesting and contested by more candidates than ever before. The presidency is symbolic and usually the candidatures are carefully controlled by the political parties. To get a nomination, a candidate must be supported by at least 20 parliamentarians or four county councils. Some of the political parties allowed their supporters on county councils to nominate popular independents, thus opening up the election. The other important difference compared to previous elections was the collapse in support for the candidates associated with some of the main parties, notably Gay Mitchell, whose party had just won the parliamentary elections earlier this year with 27 percent of the vote. He emerged from the contest with only 6 percent of the vote. The winner was Michael D. Higgins, a popular figure in the less popular Irish Labour Party. While Labour scored a comparatively high 19 percent in the parliamentary elections, Higgins doubled that to 40 percent in the presidential election. It seems that personality is everything.

Under the AV system, the votes were counted as follows.

Michael  D. Higgins was ahead from the start and as lower-placed candidates were eliminated this did not change. Indeed, he picked up more transfers than Sean Gallagher at both of the successive relevant counts. At the second count, the transfers from Dana Scallon and Mary Davis for Gay Mitchell were higher than they were for Martin McGuiness of Sinn Fein. The elimination of McGuiness and Mitchell in the final count led to an avalanche of transfers to Higgins in an anti-Fianna Fail surge. Although the scores of McGuiness and Gallagher were respectable, they were very few people’s second preference.

Nothing is surprising about Ireland, but a final curiosity is that McGuiness, the third placed candidate for the Presidency of Ireland, had no vote in the election because he is a UK resident. He is also a member of the British Parliament. If he had been elected, we would have seen the strange event of the head of state of a Republic requesting a manorial stewardship from the Crown in order to be able to resign from Westminster.



If he gets a "no", he still wins. A "no" will be a "no" to the bail-out, a "no" to its various strings attached, and a "no" to the 50% write-down of Greek debt. The Greek people will have only themselves to blame for the disastrous consequences of a "no". After a few years, who can come back to save Greece? Papandreou.